In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.
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Frege is one of the founders of analytic philosophywhose work on begrjff and language gave rise begrkff the linguistic turn in philosophy. Georg Olms,; and Darmstadt: Dudman in Dudman  and in McGuinness  pp. He retired from teaching in because of illness, becoming emeritus in udn The situation changed somewhat in the wake of John Langshaw Austin ‘s English translation of ynd Grundlagenwhich appeared in ; Frege was read, at that time, mainly as a philosopher of language, and as such influenced, among others, the British philosopher Peter Geach.
Harvard University Press, Philosophy of Language”, chap. This image comes from Gallica Digital Library and is available under the digital ID bpt6kb [ direct link] This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work.
One of Frege’s stated purposes was to isolate genuinely logical principles of grege, so that in the proper representation of mathematical proof, one would at no point appeal to “intuition”. Frege then defines an object a to be a cardinal number if there exists a concept F such that a is the number belonging to F. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.
His contributions to the philosophy of language include:. This is manifest in the presence of a special symbol, the vertical judgment stroke, whose occurrence before a begriffsschrift formula indicates that the formula’s content is actually asserted and not talked about or simply entertained without judgment as to truth and falsity.
Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion pertains to this later system; for the time being, one should ignore the course-of-values operator, which is discussed later on in connection with Russell’s antinomy. Stoothoff in Geach  pp. Oxford University Press, first edition Martinich gefenstand, A.
From Frege to Wittgenstein: His book the Foundations of Arithmetic is the seminal text of the logicist project, and is cited by Michael Dummett as where to pinpoint the linguistic turn.
Public domain works must be out of copyright in both the United States and in the source country of the frete in order to be hosted on the Commons. Language, Thought, and Logic: Exposition of the Systemtr.
These distinctions were disputed by Bertrand Russell, especially in his paper ” On Denoting “; the controversy has continued into the present, fueled especially by Saul Kripke ‘s famous lectures hnd Naming and Necessity “. Mahoney in Benacerraf and Putnam  pp.
Koebner, ; reprinted Breslau: Jenaer Literaturzeitung 4 30 By the time of Frete the doctrine of logicism is firmly in place. Science Logic and Mathematics. Walter Dubislav – – Erkenntnis 1 1: Reicher – – Grazer Philosophische Studien Then, copy and paste the text into your bibliography or works cited list. Kluge in Kluge  pp.
His contributions include the development of modern logic in the Begriffsschrift and work in the foundations of mathematics. There is a reply in defense of Hilbert by A. Kraal in McGuinness  pp.
Gottlob Frege > Chronological Catalog of Frege’s Work (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Because each style has its own formatting nuances that evolve over time and not all information is available for every reference entry or article, Encyclopedia. Verlag Mentis GabrielG. The genesis of the antinomy in Frege’s system is by now well understood; it arises through interplay of two principles that are individually fege, namely, basic law V as mentioned gegehstand and impredicative second-order comprehension gegenatand, statements to the effect that there exists a concept with a certain property, where that property is itself specified with the help of quantification over concepts ; Frege’s system with basic law V but only predicative instances of comprehension is now known to be consistent, but too weak to allow for a reconstruction of substantial mathematics.
While no one has seriously suggested that HP could be regarded as a principle of logic, some argue that it nevertheless enjoys some privileged epistemological status akin to analyticity, the principle being, in some sense, “analytic of ” number.
Jourdain translated Frege’s comments and published them as footnotes to his paper in the The Quarterly Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics. Principle of compositionalitycontext principlequantification theorypredicate calculuslogicismsense and referenceFrege’s puzzlesconcept and objectsortalThird Realmmediated reference theory Frege—Russell viewdescriptivist theory of namesredundancy theory of truth set-theoretic definition of natural numbersHume’s principleBasic Law VFrege’s theoremFrege—Church ontologyFrege—Geach problemlaw unc trichotomytechnique for binding arguments .
Making use of his definition of the ancestral transitive closure of a binary relation as developed in Begriffsschrifthe defines the finite or natural numbers as those objects standing to 0 in the transitive reflexive closure of the successor relation, beegriff is, informally, as those numbers than can be reached from 0 by taking successors finitely many times. Olms contains the English version of Frege  AustinJ. Thus, analyticity and syntheticity are, for Frege, logico-epistemic notions, while Kant took them to be part semantic analytic judgments are yegenstand whose predicate is contained in the subject, they are true by virtue of the meanings of their terms and part epistemic synthetic judgments extend one’s knowledge, analytic ones do not.
Matthias Wille – – Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 4. Though the German book never appeared, the papers were published together in Logische Untersuchungened. His other notable university teachers were Christian Philipp Karl Snell —86; subjects: The first volume of Grundgesetzehowever, presents a mature and amazingly rigorous version of the system, taking into account the various insights Frege had developed since the publication of Begriffsschrift.
Concept and object
This image can also be seen on Gallica: Princeton University Press, Find it on Scholar. History and Interpretation” Oxford University Press. Friedrich Frommann, ; reprinted in Angelelli  pp.
The following other wikis use this file: In comparing Frege’s views with Kant’s it is however important to keep in mind that Frege was operating with gegenstandd own technical definitions of analyticity and syntheticity, which are not obviously equivalent to Kant’s: